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THE PAST DECADE  HAS WITNESSED  a  fairly  rapid  growth  in  federal  ex- 
penditures, in both absolute and relative terms. Numerous new programs 
have been introduced and existing programs expanded. As can be seen in 
Table  1,  federal expenditures have  risen from less  than  18 percent of 
potential gross national product (GNP)  in  1961, to  about 20 percent in 
1970 and are scheduled to rise even further in 1972. They have outpaced 
total federal revenues, which as a percent of potential GNP also rose be- 
tween 1961 and 1970, but will decline somewhat when the tax legislation of 
1969 and 1971 becomes fully effective. The shift in the percentages reflects 
the disappearance  of the large full employment surplus  that prevailed in the 
early 1960s and the prospective emergence of a full employment deficit. 
The composition of expenditures has altered markedly. Transfer pay- 
ments and grants-in-aid  to state and local governments have grown rapidly 
over the past decade and purchases of goods and services have declined in 
importance. Transfers and grants together have risen from 5.8 percent of 
potential GNP in 1961 to 8.4 percent in 1970 and are scheduled to rise to 
10.2 percent in 1972. The decline in defense purchases over the decade has 
been marked, and it has been offset only partially by rising nondefense 
purchases. 
In light of the changes in both composition and size of expenditures it 
* I am grateful  to Nancy C. Wilson, who assisted  in the research  on this paper.  Parts 
of the paper  were  made possible  by the model of state  and local government  receipts  and 
expenditures  developed  by Robert D. Reischauer  of the Brookings  Institution. 
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Table 1.  Expenditures  and Revenues  of the Federal Sector at Full 
Employment  as a Percentage of Potential Gross National Product, 
by Category, 1961, 1970, and  1972a 
Category  1961  1970  1972 
Expenditures 
Purchases  of goods and services  10.2  9.5  8.7 
Defense  8.5  7. 3  6.5 
Nondefense  1.7  2.1  2.2 
Transfer  payments  4.5  6.0  6.7 
Grants-in-aid  1.3  2.4  3.5 
All other  1.8  2.0  1.5 
Total expenditures  17.8  19.8  20.5 
Revenues 
Personal  taxes  8.8  9.3  8.6 
Corporate  taxes  4.8  4.4  3.6 
Indirect  business  taxes  2.6  2.0  1.8 
Social security  taxes  3.5  5.0  5.6 
Total revenues  19.7  20.7  19.6 
Sources: Potential gross national product is based on estimates of the Council of Economic Advisers. 
Other basic data are from Office of Business Economics, The National Inconme  and Product Accouints  of the 
United States, 1929-1965: Statistical Tables (1966); Economic  Indicators  (November 1971); and Arthur M. 
Okun and Nancy H. Teeters, "The Full Employment Surplus Revisited," Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activfrv  (1: 1970), Table 2, pp. 104-05. Figures are rounded and may not add to totals. 
a.  National income accounts basis. Data are for calendar years. 
becomes appropriate to  review and update the evidence on the built-in 
flexibility of the expenditure side of the budget. That is the purpose of this 
paper. 
Built-in flexibility is defined as the automatic changes in expenditures or 
tax yields that result when the expenditure and tax laws are held constant: 
Certain  public expenditures,  such as unemployment  benefits or price-support 
payments,  are geared  to move in a counter-cyclical  fashion.  Similarly,  tax yields 
obtained from given statutory  rates rise and fall with changes  in the level of 
income and, hence, in the tax base.' 
As Musgrave's statement implies, the issue of built-in flexibility applies 
to both sides of the budget. Yet very little research  has been devoted to the 
automatic response of  expenditures to  cyclical fluctuations, in  contrast 
with the thorough exploration of revenue elasticities. It is important to 
1. Richard  A. Musgrave,  The Theory  of Public Finance:  A Study in Public  Economy 
(McGraw-Hill,  1959),  p. 506. Nancy H. Teeters  617 
know  whether the  rapid  growth  of  older  programs such  as  old-age, 
survivors, and disability insurance has altered the automatic response of 
the budget to deviations from full employment, and to  determine which 
of  the  many  new  programs  are  automatically  responsive  to  cyclical 
variations. 
Some estimates of the magnitude of the dollar amount of the automatic 
change in expenditures for deviations upward and downward from 4 per- 
cent unemployment will be made. But these estimates are restricted to the 
impact of changes in real economic activity and do not extend to  auto- 
matic responses to changes in the price level. 
In fact, only a few types of federal outlays respond systematically to 
inflation. Interest payments have a truly automatic response. In terms of 
stabilization policy,  however, it  is  a  perverse response. As  the  rate of 
inflation increases, both private and government interest rates rise, not 
only in response to the inflation but usually also as a result of tightening 
monetary policy. Thus, government expenditures for interest rise at a time 
when  expenditure increases are  destabilizing. Automatic  cost-of-living 
adjustments  in the civilian and military retirement  programs also introduce 
a built-in response to inflation. 
The effect of rising prices on other expenditures is not automatic, but 
price increases add to  outlays with a lag. The agencies are instructed to 
make  projected estimates for  the  coming  fiscal year, which  begins six 
months after the budget is submitted, in prices of the current  calendar year. 
Benefits for transfer programs tend to be raised by legislative action when 
the cost of living is rising rapidly. 
The concern for the built-in flexibility of the federal budget arises be- 
cause the greater it is the more markedly the budget responds to changing 
economic  conditions.  Discretionary fiscal policy-deliberate  changes in 
expenditures or tax  laws-require  legislation. That process tends to  be 
slow: The problem has to be recognized and diagnosed, and a correctional 
program proposed, worked through the appropriate congressional com- 
mittees, and, finally, passed by both houses. In 1947 the Committee for 
Economic  Development proposed that built-in stabilizers should do  all 
or most of the budgetary  job of stabilizing the economy.2 In a 1969 policy 
statement the CED summarized  what for many economists were the lessons 
of the decade of the 1960s: 
2.  Committee  for  Economic  Development,  Taxes  and  the Budget:  A  Program for 
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We reaffirm  our support  of the automatic  stabilizers  in the fiscal  system. 
However,  the stabilizing  effect of the built-in  flexibility  of the tax system is 
not by itself adequate.  Taxes and expenditures  cannot be left unattended  and 
unadjusted  for long periods of time. Annual review of the level of taxes and 
expenditures  and the balance  in the budget  is necessary  to achieve  our economic 
objectives. 
When the economy is not experiencing  high employment  and stable prices 
(when  it is operating  below or above its potential),  the built-in  flexibility  of the 
budget will provide a stabilizing  influence.  But there will be times when this 
built-in flexibility  should be supplemented  by specific actions affecting  both 
federal  expenditures  and tax rates.3 
Although built-in flexibility is not the whole answer, the more of it the 
better. After assessing the degree to  which it exists in the various cate- 
gories of federal expenditures, this study will look at a few proposals for 
augmenting the built-in flexibility on the expenditure side. 
Government  Purchases  of Goods  and  Services 
Variations in federal purchases do not occur as an automatic response 
to changes in economic activity.4 Any program carried out by the federal 
government itself usually involves purchases.5 Some are controllable by 
discrete policy  decisions  and  some  are not,  at  least  in  the  short  run. 
Controllability is greater in theory than practice. Although theoretically 
and even technically the nation could decide not to have a military estab- 
lishment, or to conduct atomic research, or to maintain a national parks 
system, in fact these are ongoing programs. The only aspects of purchases 
that are semiautomatic (and that only recently and imperfectly) are the 
annual increases in military and civilian pay, and these respond to econ- 
omy-wide movements in wage rates, rather  than to changes in real activity.6 
3. Committee  for Economic Development,  Fiscal and Monetary  Policies  for Steady 
Economic  Growth  (CED, 1969),  p. 19. 
4.  For a description  of each of the categories  of receipts and expenditures  in the 
national income accounts,  see "Special  Analysis A," in Special  Analyses,  Budget  of the 
United  States, 1970, pp. 7-18. 
5. The main exceptions are the government-sponsored  enterprises-the postal ser- 
vice, the Tennessee  Valley  Authority,  and so forth-that  are  recorded  in both the unified 
and national  income accounts  budgets  on a net surplus  or deficit  basis. 
6. The amount of the pay increase  is determined  by an annual  comparability  survey 
but the President  must sign an executive  order  to put the increase  into effect.  A majority 
vote by Congress  can override  a presidential  decision not to grant the comparability 
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Even the decision to let last year's price increase be reflected in next year's 
budget estimates is discretionary  in that it requires congressional approval. 
In practice, inflation creates an  opportunity to  reduce the real level  of 
program activity by  holding  the  funding constant  in  dollar terms.  In 
general, however, changes in  federal purchases, especially defense pur- 
chases, contribute to the cyclical variations in the economy, but are not 
directly affected by them. 
Transfer  Payments 
The federal transfer payments include old-age and survivors insurance 
benefits (OASI);  disability insurance benefits (DI);  medicare, and  civil 
service and military retirement programs; unemployment insurance bene- 
fits-state,  federal, and railroad (UI);  veterans' pensions and disability 
compensation (VA);  and the four welfare programs-old-age  assistance 
(OAA),  aid to  the blind, aid to  the  disabled, and aid to  families with 
dependent children (AFDC). The welfare components of grants-in-aid are 
included in the analysis of transfer payments. Since the federal welfare 
grants to  states  pass  through to  individuals as  state  or  local  transfer 
payments7 and are open-ended, this treatment seemed appropriate. 
In an attempt to isolate the cyclical response of transfer payments, the 
change in the natural log in the seasonally adjusted number of recipients 
of benefits under the various programs was correlated with various cycli- 
cally sensitive measures of economic activity. 
One of the problems in trying to correlate any measure of these programs 
with cyclical variables lies in the frequent changes in the laws governing 
eligibility and amount of compensation. By use of the rate of change in the 
number of people receiving benefits, any change in the rate of compensation 
(a 10 percent increase in OASI benefits, for example) can be finessed. Ex- 
pansion in coverage (the "blanketing in" to OASI of the military in 1956, 
7. Technically,  the federal government  is committed  to reimbursing  state and local 
governments  for a formula-determined  percentage  of certain  types of welfare  expendi- 
tures.  The highly complicated  formulas  include  the number  of beneficiaries,  a minimum 
federal  payment  per beneficiary,  and a varying  amount above the minimum  depending 
on the per capita income of the state. The reimbursement  rates, therefore,  vary from 
state to state but average  about 55 percent.  A further  complication  is the fact that a 
more generous  reimbursement  formula  exists under the medicaid  program  and can be 
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for example) is not eliminated. Dummy variables have been used to take 
account of shifts created by changes in eligibility rules. 
The quarterly data for the number of recipients under each program 
were seasonally adjusted.8  As would be expected, strong seasonal patterns 
appear in the number of people receiving  unemployment benefits. There is a 
mild but noticeable seasonal factor in the AFDC rolls, which tend to rise in 
the winter months. The federal and military retirement programs are even 
less affected by the seasons, although the increases in the number of bene- 
ficiaries  is larger  in the first and second quarters  than in the latter half of the 
year, probably because retirement decisions are frequently made on a cal- 
endar year basis. The seasonal adjustment factors for 1970 are shown in 
Table 2. 
Regressions were computed with the quarterly  change in the natural logs 
of the number of persons receiving benefits under the various transfer pro- 
grams as the dependent variable and various measures of unemployment 
and employment as the independent variables, also expressed as changes in 
natural logs.9 The dummy variables, the unemployment rate in the OASI 
Table 2.  Seasonal Adjustment  Factors for the Number of Persons 
Receiving Benefits from Various Transfer Programs, Quarterly, 1970 
Calendar  quarters 
Program  1  2  3  4 
State unemployment  insurance  137.7  86.5  76.7  98.9 
Old-age  and survivors  insurance  100.0  99.7  100.0  100. 1 
Disability  insurance  100.2  100.0  99.8  99.9 
Medicare,  civil service,  and military  retirement 
programs  100.0  100.2  99.9  99.7 
Aid to families  with dependent  children  101.4  99.2  99.0  100.2 
Old-age  assistance  99.9  99.5  99.9  100.5 
Aid to the blind  99.7  99.5  100.1  100.6 
Veterans  Administration  pensions  and 
compensation  99.8  99.9  100.0  100.2 
General  welfare  102.8  96.1  99.8  101.1 
Source: Computed from data in Social Security Bulletin, various issues, using the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census standard X-1 1 program. 
8. The U.S. Bureau of the Census standard  X-1  1 program  was used to make the 
seasonal adjustment. 
9. For small changes,  the use of natural  logs approximates  regressing  the percentage 
change in the dependent  variable against percentage  changes in the independent  vari- 
ables. Natural logs were used instead of percentage  changes to avoid the asymmetries 
that occur with large negative  and positive percentage  changes. Nancy H. Teeters  621 
regressions, and the average age variable in the equations for veterans are 
the only variables  not in the form of natural logs. The correlations were run 
for the period 1948:1 through 1970:4. Because some of these programs 
evolved during the decade of the 1950s, two subsets were also run: 1950:1 
through 1960:4 and 1960:1 through 1970:4.  Since the regressions were 
corrected for autoregression, the dynamic R2s are better indicators of the 
amount of variation explained. 
UNEMPLOYMENT  BENEFITS 
As was to be expected, the percentage change in the number of people 
receiving unemployment benefits is correlated with the change in the num- 
ber of unemployed males aged 20 or older (as shown in Table 3). The two 
dependent variables  differ  to the extent that the second includes beneficiaries 
under the railroad retirement and federal employee insurance programs as 
well as under state programs. Yet the R2s and the dynamic R2s are virtually 
all less than 0.5, reflecting  the gap between global unemployment and cov- 
ered unemployment. The slope is consistently around 0.85. 
The gap between global and covered unemployment occurs for two rea- 
sons. First, new entrants and reentrants  to the labor force have not worked 
in covered employment and are not entitled to benefits. Second, the total 
unemployment rate and the covered unemployment rate vary from state to 
state in part because state legislatures can, and some do, extend coverage 
beyond the types of employment that must be covered because of federal 
laws. Even if all states met only the federal requirements, the coverage 
would vary because of variation in industry mix among the states. Table 4 
shows the 1970 covered unemployment rates, total unemployment rates, 
and the ratio of the first to the second, state by state.10 
The Employment Security  Amendments of 1970 extended the mandatory 
coverage of the state programs to 4.8 million people, including agricultural 
and hospital workers and employees of nonprofit and higher education 
institutions. Still not covered by federal law are domestic and temporary 
employees; federal, state, and local government employees; employees of 
foreign  governments or  international organizations;  and  railroad em- 
10. The variation in coverage is probably not as large as is indicated  in Table 4. 
Each state estimates  total unemployment  annually  using a procedure  established  by the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,  but there is some question that all states follow the 
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Table 3.  Relationship  of Change  in Number  of Persons Receiving 
Unemployment  Benefits to Change in Number of Unemployed 
Males 20 Years Old and Over, Selected Periods, 1948-70a 
Change  in natural  logs of seasonally  adjusted  quarterly  data 
Quarterly  Squared 
chanige  in  Squared  dynamic 
natural  correla- correla- Standard  Durbin- 
log of un-  tion co-  tion co-  error  of  Watson 
Period  and  employed efficient efficientb  estimate  statistic 
program  Constant  males  P2  DA2  SEE  D W 
1948-70 
State unemployment  0.0061  0.8802  0.51  0.48  0.1009  2.064 
insurance  (0.7)  (12.2) 
State, federal,  and  0.0006  0.8566  0.48  0.44  0.1034  2.071 
railroad  unemploy-  (0.1)  (11.9) 
ment insurance 
1950-60 
State unemployment  0.0025  0.8287  0.47  0.43  0.1210  1.985 
insurance  (0.2)  (8.0) 
State, federal,  and  0.0013  0.8686  0.46  0.41  0.1256  1.985 
railroad  unemploy-  (0.1)  (8.2) 
ment insurance 
1960-70 
State unemployment  0.0072  0.8592  0.46  0.46  0.0810  1.946 
insurance  (0.7)  (7.4) 
State, federal,  and  0.0070  0.8350  0.46  0.45  0.0792  1.963 
railroad  unemploy-  (0.7)  (7.4) 
ment insurance 
Sources: Basic data are from Social Security Bulletin, various issues, and Employment  and Earnings,  Vol 
17 (February 1971), p. 157. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses here and in subsequent tables are t-statistics. 
b.  The dynamic 7R2  was developed by George Schink for use in the Brookings regression program. It is 
calculated in the usual manner except that the values are generated by a dynamic simulation, which involves 
replacement of the observed lagged dependent variable by its predicted value. 
ployees,  insurance agents, newspaper boys,  and professional fishermen. 
Federal and railroad employees are covered under separate systems. The 
1970 act should narrow the variation in the rates between covered and total 
unemployment among the states shown in Table 4. 
In 1969, the latest date for which data on covered employment are avail- 
able, those in covered employment and unemployment accounted for 76 
percent of the labor force.11  By estimating the ultimate increase in covered 
11. Includes  military  personnel,  who have their own readjustment  benefits,  including 
unemployment  insurance. o  S 
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employment and covered unemployment (adjusted to 4 percent), making 
rough estimates of how many of the 4.8 million newly eligible workers be- 
came covered in 1971, and assuming all of the 4.8 million are covered in 
1972, rough estimates of the increased coverage can be made. They indicate 
that coverage rose to 79 percent of the total labor force in 1971 from the 76 
percent in 1969 and will increase to approximately 80 percent in 1973. 
The big increase in coverage probably occurred  in 1971, not only because 
so many of the states exercised the option of passing the legislation before 
the mandatory January 1972 date, but also because the big states were in 
that group. The legislation provides for thirteen additional weeks of bene- 
fit payments if the national seasonally adjusted covered unemployment rate 
is equal to or above 4.5 percent for three consecutive months or if the state 
seasonally adjusted covered unemployment rate is 4 percent or above for 
three consecutive months and 20 percent or more above the rate in the cor- 
responding three months of the preceding two years. If the national trigger 
is deactivated, a state's trigger will remain active if its covered unemploy- 
ment rate equals or exceeds 4 percent or is 120 percent or more of that in the 
preceding  two years. Table 5 shows by weeks the number of states triggered 
on starting in February 1971 when the monitoring system began. In the first 
three or four months of the monitoring, not all of the states meeting the 
trigger criteria had passed the enabling legislation. But by September, all 
such states had passed the legislation. 
Under the extended unemployment insurance program $250 million was 
paid out in fiscal 1971, and $225 million during the first four months of 
fiscal 1972. The number of states triggered on and the number of persons 
receiving extended benefits have dropped fairly steadily since April, as can 
be seen in Table 5. However, the global covered unemployment rate (the 
next to last column) has remained static; it does not include those receiving 
benefits under the extended coverage program. Thus, unemployment under 
the regular  programs has been rising. Total covered unemployment includ- 
ing that under extended coverage is used in calculating the state triggers but 
has not been used in calculating the national trigger. If all covered unem- 
ployment  (regular plus  extended) were used  to  calculate  the  national 
trigger, it is quite likely that the national trigger would have been activated 
in 1971. 
Weekly insured unemployment during the first eight months  of  1971 
averaged 2,730,000, about 45 percent above the 1,875,000 average for the 
comparable period in  1970. In  March, the  average weekly benefit was Nancy H. Teeters  625 
Table 5.  Number of States with Extended Unemployment  Trigger On, 
Number of Persons Receiving Such Benefits, by Weeks, and 
Monthly Unemployment  Rate, February-October  1971 
Number of persons 
Month and  Number of  receivinzg  extended  Monithly unemploymentt acite 
week in  states with  unemployment inslrance 
1971  trigger on  (thou0sands)  Covered  Total 
February  20  30  249  3.8%  5.8% 
27  30  274  A~58 
March  6  30  302 
13  31  318  3.9  6.0 
20  32  325 
27  32  341 
April  3  32  336 
10  30  3394061 
17  29  316  4.0  6.1 
24  29  301 
May  1  29  291 
8  29  282 
15  29  287  4.2  6.2 
22  30  279 
29  29  277 
June  5  26  280 
12  23  283  4.4  5.6 
19  23  278 
26  21  282 
July  3  20  280 
10  19  274 
17  19  273  4.0  5.8 
24  18  259 
31  18  262 
August  7  18  261 
14  18  255  4.2  6.1 
21  18  252 
28  18  254 
September  4  16  255 
11  15  247  4.5  6.0 
18  15  259 
25  15  250 
October  2  15  255 
9  15  255 
16  15  244  4.5  5.8 
23  15  241 
30  15  240 
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, "Trigger  Notices," UIPL No. 1103 (March 4, 1971 through Novem- 
ber 12, 1971), Nos. 1 through 37; Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, Office of Financial and 
Management  Information Systems, "Unemployment Insurance  Claims," Vols. 26,27 (1971), Nos. 37-52 and 
1-18, respectively;  Economic  Indicators  (November 1971), pp. 11, 12; unpublished  data from Manpower Ad. 
ministration, Office of Manpower Management Data Systems. 626  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
$52.94. The unemployment benefit programs were putting $650 million a 
quarter  more into the economy than a year earlier, or $2.6 billion at annual 
rates. During the first eight months of 1970, the average global unemploy- 
ment rate was 4.6 percent, compared with 6.0 percent for the same period in 
1971. The difference  between 4.6 and 4 percent unemployment accounts for 
another $1 billion of benefits, bringing the total stabilizing contribution of 
the unemployment insurance program (including the extended unemploy- 
ment benefits) to $3.6 billion for 1971.12 
OLD-AGE  AND  SURVIVORS  BENEFITS 
In investigating the relationship between OASI and cyclical factors, a 
dummy variable was added in the OASI regression for each major legisla- 
tive change in eligibility requirements.  The legislative changes are obviously 
very important and showed up as highly significant variables in regressions 
that covered lengthy periods of time. However, only a twelve-year period 
was used in the final regression  because, after a good deal of experimenting, 
the most significant independent variable was found to be the unemploy- 
ment rate for married males and the lagged change in their number. Since 
the unemployment data on married males dates from 1955, the regression 
period must be limited to 1958-70 in order to accommodate the three-year 
lag. As it happened, only one major legislative change in coverage occurred 
in the period 1958-70. The level of the unemployment rate for married men 
turned out to  be an irrepressibly significant variable, as did the lagged 
change in the log of the number of unemployed. My interpretation of this 
is that the rate of unemployment as well as the rate of change has an impact 
12. The amount  of increased  expenditures  under  the unemployment  benefit  program 
was derived by using the equations to project the increase  in the number of persons 
receiving  benefits  at the rates of unemployment  that obtained  versus  what would have 
occurred  if the global rate  had stayed  at 4 percent.  The increase  in the number  of people 
times the average  benefits  yields the total amount of increased  expenditures  under  the 
regular  program.  The extended  program  started after the regression  period. Expendi- 
tures under the program of extended benefits were derived  by taking the number of 
people receiving  extended benefits (as shown in the weekly release of the Manpower 
Administration,  "Unemployment  Insurance  Claims")  times  the average  weekly  benefits. 
The total derived  increase  in expenditures  (regular  plus extended)  was compared  with 
the increase  in actual  expenditures  for all unemployment  benefits  shown in the Monthly 
Treasury  Statement,  "Preliminary  Statement  of Receipts  and Expenditures  of the United 
States Government."  The two numbers  were almost identical. Nancy H. Teeters  627 
on the retirement  decision. A person eligible for retirement is less likely to 
seek employment when the rate of unemployment is high than when it is 
low. Only after three quarters did the rate of change in the number of un- 
employed begin to exert positive influence on the rate of increase in OASI 
beneficiaries.  The size of the coefficients and of their t-statistics increased 
from the  fourth through the  seventh quarters. This  implies that  older 
workers first use up their unemployment benefits and then turn to retire- 
ment. Starting four quarters after the period to which the specified unem- 




unemployment  Coefficient  t-statistic 
4  0.0126  1.5 
5  0.0124  1.9 
6  0.0117  2.1 
7  0.0107  2.1 
8  0.0094  2.0 
9  0.0076  1.8 
10  0.0054  1.7 
11  0.0029  1.6 
Among the transfer programs, OASI is one of the major sources of in- 
crease in built-in flexibility. Since OASI is the largest of these programs-it 
had 23.5 million beneficiaries in 1970-an  increase in the unemployment 
rates and in the number of persons unemployed adds considerably to the 
number of beneficiaries. If the national unemployment rate remains at 6 
percent (which implies a 3 percent unemployment rate for married men) 
through the end of 1973, over 2.7 million people will receive OASI benefits 
who would not have done so if the national unemployment rate had re- 
mained at the 4.2 percent that prevailed in the first quarter of  1970. In 
terms of equation (1) below, the higher rate of unemployment accounts for 
2.2 million of the increase in the number of beneficiaries  and the increase in 
the number of unemployed men for 500,000. The actual increase to 6 per- 
cent in unemployment raised OASI expenditures by more than a billion 
dollars in calendar year 1971. If the rate continues at 6 percent, it will raise 
expenditures  in calendar 1972 by nearly $3 billion. OASI clearly now quali- 
fies, along with unemployment benefits, as a cyclically affected expenditure. 
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(1)  OASI  =  -0.0016  +  0.0451D  +  0.0051RMM +  0.0412YSUMM, 
(0.6)  (8.2)  (6.1)  (1.9) 
72  =  0.70;  DW2  = 0.70; standard  error =  0.0055;  Durbin-Watson  =  1.923. 
Period of fit =  1958-70. 
The numbers  in parentheses  here and in subsequent  equations  are t-statistics. 
where OASI is the change in the natural  log of the seasonally adjusted num- 
ber of people receiving old-age and survivors insurance benefits, D is the 
dummy variable for the 1966 expansion in coverage, RMM  is the unemploy- 
ment rate of married males, and IUMM  is the sum of the weights of the 
Almon lags of the change in the natural log of the number of unemployed 
married males.'3 
AID  TO FAMILIES WITH  DEPENDENT  CHILDREN 
The rate of growth in the AFDC  welfare rolls is highly responsive to 
the rate of change in the number of unemployed people, especially when the 
change in unemployment enters the equation with an eight-quarter  Almon 
lag, as is shown in Table 6. The dummy used in the AFDC  equation-it 
Table 6.  Relationship  of Change  in Number  of Persons Receiving  AFDC 
Benefits to Change  in Number  of Unemployed,  Selected Periods, 1950-70 
Change  in natural  log of seasonally  adjusted  quarterly  data 
Change  in  Squared 
natural  Squared  dynamic 
log of un-  correla- correla- Standard  Durbin- 
employed, tion co-  tion co-  error  of  Watson 
summed  efficient efficient  estimate  statistic 
Period  Constant  Dummnya  2;AUELFb  R2  DR2  SEE  D W 
1950-70  0.0094  0.0029  0.2489  0.88  0.79  0.0082  2.034 
(3.5)  (6.9)  (5.7) 
1950-60  0.0067  ...  0.2513  0.82  0.58  0.0074  1.9555 
(1.7)  (5.2) 
1960-70  0.0156  0.0024  0.2866  0.88  0.87  0.0082  1.873 
(6.9)  (8.2)  (4.0) 
Sources: Basic data are from Social Security Bulletin, various issues, and Employment  antd  Earnintgs,  Vol. 
17 (February 1971), p. 155. 
a.  Dummy is 1 for 1966:1, rising by 1 in each subsequent quarter. 
b.  Sum of the weights of the Almon lags of change in the natural log  of the number of unemployed 
persons. 
13. Basic data are from Social Security  Bulletin, various issues; Employment  and 
Earnings,  Vol. 17 (February  1971),  p. 181; unpublished  data from U.S. Bureau  of Labor 
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is 1 in the first quarter of 1966 and rises by 1 in each subsequent quarter- 
is a purely pragmatic device. It is an effort to account for the upsurge in 
the rate of growth of the rolls that is amply evident in the data starting 
in  1966. At  this time,  any explanation involves speculation rather than 
hard evidence. I believe that the shift is directly related to the civil rights 
movement and the war on  poverty, for the pool  of  people eligible for 
AFDC  has always been large. The increasing attention given to the prob- 
lems of poverty, by both public and private groups, not only has heightened 
the  awareness of  poor  people  of their rights and benefits but also  has 
made being on welfare  more socially acceptable. The developments over the 
past five years may constitute a transition to a new level of participation 
in the program, rather than a trend that will continue for another five 
years. But there is no  assurance that the adjustment to  a new level has 
been completed. At  the present time, the rate of increase in the rolls is 
being affected by administrative and legislative tightening of the eligibility 
rules at the state level. If the family assistance plan is passed, the whole 
program will be operating at a different level. 
Continuation of the trend rate of growth that has developed since 1965, 
by itself, adds approximately a million people a year to  the number of 
AFDC  beneficiaries. The increase in unemployment from the 4.2 percent 
of the first quarter of 1970 to 6 percent is adding another 350,000 a year. 
The increase in unemployment that has occurred added $800 million to 
federal and  $700 million to  state and local  expenditures for AFDC  in 
calendar 1971. A  continuation  of  the  unemployment rate at  6  percent 
would  add  $1.5  billion  to  federal and  $1.1  billion  to  state  and  local 
expenditures in 1972. 
VETERANS'  PROGRAMS 
The Veterans Administration makes transfer payments for pensions and 
compensation  for  service-connected disabilities-wounds,  amputations, 
and the like. Compensation rises with the severity and relative permanence 
of the injury. Veterans Administration pensions are primarily  made on the 
basis of need and are reduced as income from other sources rises. When a 
veteran applies for a pension, both his income and the degree of his disabil- 
ity, which need not be service connected, are used to establish eligibility. 
Although the veteran is supposed to be permanently and totally disabled 630  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
to qualify for a pension, the method of calculating disability varies with 
age. "At 65 a veteran is presumed by law to be 10 percent disabled which, 
at that age, constitutes total disability."''4 
The number of beneficiaries  at any given time depends on the frequency 
and timing  of  wars. Table 7  shows the  change in  caseload by  war of 
participation. There has been a net  addition of nearly 800,000 to the VA 
beneficiary rolls in the past ten years. To take account of the variation 
in the number of people eligible and of the increase in eligibility as they 
grow older, the number of veterans, by war of origin, was multiplied by 
their average age for each year. This weighted variable was then divided 
by the total  number of  veterans to  estimate average age. Both the cal- 
culated average age and the total number of veterans were used as inde- 
pendent variables. The results, given in Table 8, reveal sharp differences 
between the fifties and the sixties. In the 1950s, the rate of increase in the 
beneficiary  rolls was heavily influenced  by the growth in the veteran popula- 
tion  and  by  their  increasing age.  Changing  unemployment had  little 
impact. In the decade of the 1960s, the rate of increase was dominated by 
the rate of  change in the number of  unemployed men, and the rate of 
change in the number of potential eligibles was less important; while the 
average age of veterans is highly significant  in the 1960s, its sign is negative. 
The increase in the calculated average age began in the early part of the 
decade, and slowed down radically after the Vietnam veterans began to 
enter the  population.  By  the  end  of  the  decade,  the  average age  was 
actually declining. 
With the population and age variables used to account for variation in 
eligibility, the rate of growth in the number of VA beneficiaries  was corre- 
lated with the rate of change in the number of unemployed males, 20 years 
of age and over. The important thing in the VA equations from the point of 
view of this study is the positive correlation, shown in Table 8, between the 
rate of growth in the VA compensation and pension rolls and the percent- 
age change in the number of unemployed males, 20 years of age or older. 
The relationship is not only positive throughout the entire twenty-year pe- 
riod, but also stronger and statistically significant  in the 1960-70 subperiod. 
If the number of unemployed males, 20 years of age or older, had grown 
only at the rate of the growth in the labor force-that  is, if the unemploy- 
ment rate had remained constant at the first quarter 1970 level-29,000 
14. Gilbert  Y. Steiner,  The  State of Welfare  (Brookings  Institution,  1971). %C  r-  as  Nt  (  o  e :  io 
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fewer people would have been receiving VA  benefits; and with average 
benefits of  $104 per month the result would have been $36 million less 
federal expenditure. 
OTHER FEDERAL TRANSFER  PROGRAMS 
As might be expected, the number of beneficiaries  of disability insurance, 
and of recipients of categories of welfare for adults (old-age assistance and 
aid to  the  blind and disabled), is unresponsive to  cyclical factors. The 
results are shown in Table 9. The dummy used in the DI  regression, as 
before, denotes the one legislative change in eligibility in the regression 
period. Dummy variables for each expansion in OASDI were tested and 
only one had any statistical significance for changes in the old-age assis- 
tance rolls: the expansion of social security benefits to persons over age 72 
regardless of whether they had wage credits. As the eligibility for social 
security was expanded in 1966, elderly people switched from the welfare 
to the social security rolls. 
Nor  do civil service retirement rolls respond significantly to economic 
conditions, as can be seen in the following equations: 
(2)  FCSR =  0.0183 +  0.0154AUMM, 
(11.3)  (1.4) 
R2  = 0.16; DiZ2 = 0.02; standard  error = 0.0081; Durbin-Watson  =  1.956. 
Period of fit =  1955-70. 
(3)  FCSR  =  0.0158  +  0.0204AUMM, 
(10.1)  (1.3) 
R2  = 0.02; DR2  =  -0.01;  standard  error =  0.0084; Durbin-Watson  =  1.860. 
Period of fit  1960-70. 
where FCSR is the change in the natural log  of the seasonally adjusted 
number of  people receiving federal civil service retirement benefits and 
AUMM  is the change in the natural log  of the number of unemployed 
married males.15 
15. In both equations (2) and (3), the basic data are from Social Security  Bulletin, 
various issues; Employment  and Earnings,  Vol. 17 (February  1971), p. 181; and un- 
published  data from the U.S. Bureau  of Labor Statistics. S~~~~~~~~~Il  0  NtN 
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GENERAL WELFARE 
Even though it is a state and not a federal program, general welfare 
was included in the analysis because a priori it would seem likely to  be 
cyclically responsive. As the equations in Table 10 show, it is responsive 
to the change in total employment, although that factor does not account 
alone for its rate of growth. Since general welfare is a state program there 
are at least fifty sets of rules and regulations. The variation of state systems 
and the timing of legislative changes probably introduce a great deal of 
noise into the statistical series. 
Grants-in-aid 
Federal grants-in-aid to  state and local  governments have risen from 
$7.3 billion in 1961 to $24 billion in fiscal year 1970 and are scheduled to 
Table 10. Relationship  of Change  in Number  of Beneficiaries  of State 
General Welfare Programs to Selected Cyclical Measures, 
Selected Periods, 1949-70 
Change  in natural  log of seasonally  adjusted  quarterly  data 
Change  in niatural  log 
Unem-  Squared 
ployed  Squared  dyniamic 
Total  number married  correla- correla- Standard  Durbint- 
employed,  males,  tion co-  tion co-  error  of  Watson 
summeda  sumnzedb  efficienit  efficient  estimate  statistic 
Period  Constantt  2AEHH  2AUMM  J?2  DR2  SEE  D W 
1949-70  0.0256  -6.5334  ...  0.38  0.25  0.0439  2.067 
(2.5)  (3.5) 
1950-60  0.0188  -8.1189  ...  0.42  0.35  0.0489  2.012 
(1.5)  (3.7) 
1960-70  -0.0022  1.9152  ...  0.19  0.15  0.0368  1.789 
(0.1)  (0.5) 
1955-70  0.0075  ...  0.2935  0.37  0.37  0.0366  1.944 
(1.6)  (5.7) 
1955-65  0.0006  ...  0.306  0.38  0.38  0.0385  2.013 
(0.1)  (5.2) 
1960-70  0.0081  ...  0.3412  0.38  0.37  0.0321  1.897 
(1.4)  (4.7) 
Sources: Basic data are from Social Security Bulletin, various issues; Emnployment  anid  Earnings, Vol. 17 
(February 1971); unpublished data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  Sum of the Almon lags of the change in the natural log of total number employed. 
b.  Sum of the Almon lags of the change in the natural log of the number of unemployed married men. Nancy H. Teeters  637 
rise in fiscal 1972 to more than $37 billion, including revenue sharing.16 
Has this large increase in grants enhanced the built-in flexibility of federal 
expenditures? 
As can be seen from Table 11, which presents total federal grants and 
shows the development of major new programs along with the old, the in- 
come maintenance programs grew enormously during the decade, mainly 
owing to AFDC.  Grants for highways grew by only $2 billion, much less 
than the growth in the earmarked highway trust fund revenues; the re- 
striction was mainly the result of discretionary action to restrain expendi- 
tures after the escalation of the Vietnam war. As of February 1971, $5.9 
billion of highway funds had been impounded. 
As can also be seen, federal grants for other programs, chiefly education 
and manpower training, housing and community development, and health, 
started to expand about 1965. Between 1961 and 1965 grants for programs 
other than welfare and highways grew about $1.7 billion, rising to  $3.7 
billion in  1965. From that year to  1971, they rose to  $16.2 billion, and 
they are expected to rise to  $21.6 billion in 1972. Over 80 percent of the 
1965-72  growth occurs in  nineteen programs, of  which thirteen either 
were not in existence or were funded at very low levels in 1965. 
The largest expansion occurred in the grants for education and man- 
power, reflecting the provision of aid to elementary and secondary educa- 
tion in 1965 and the manpower programs of the present administration.  The 
second largest increase has occurred in expenditures for health. In 1965 
grants to states for medical assistance were confined primarily to the indi- 
gent elderly. The large increase is the result of the introduction of medicaid, 
which in essence extended medical assistance to those on the AFDC welfare 
rolls. The final area of major growth was community development and 
housing. 
Apart  from  the  income  maintenance  grants programs, which  pass 
through to  individuals as transfers and have been discussed above,  re- 
markably few  of  these programs are likely to  be cyclically responsive. 
Medicaid  expenditures rise  automatically in  a  slack  economy  because 
AFDC rolls expand, and acceptance on the welfare rolls almost guarantees 
acceptance to the medicaid program. In fact, medicaid goes beyond the 
welfare rolls: In 1970, an average  of 10.3 million people were on welfare, but 
16. The original $4 billion requested  for revenue  sharing  had already  been reduced 
to $2.4 billion at the time this article was written. The reduction  had been partially 
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an average of 15 million received medicaid benefits. The larger number of 
medicaid recipients undoubtedly reflects,  in part, the turnover in the AFDC 
rolls, but some states provide medicaid benefits for low-income persons 
not on welfare. Assuming that only those added to  the AFDC  rolls re- 
ceived medicaid benefits, the recession has raised both federal expenditures 
for medicaid by $500 million in 1971 and state and local outlays by $500 
million. 
The second grant program that is cyclically responsive is the new system 
of grants to  state and local governments to  subsidize public service em- 
ployment. Appropriations are $750 million for fiscal year  1972 and  $1 
billion for fiscal year 1973 to  benefit areas of substantial unemployment 
(defined as unemployment equal to  or in  excess of  6 percent for three 
consecutive months).'7 The secretary of labor can make grants to  units 
of  federal, state,  or local  governments or to  institutions that  are their 
subdivisions (for  example, hospitals),  and  to  Indian  tribes to  provide 
transitional jobs  in needed public services for unemployed or underem- 
ployed  persons during periods of  relatively high unemployment. When 
the national unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) drops below 4.5 per- 
cent for three consecutive months, no more funds are to be obligated; but 
a subsequent increase in unemployment above that level for three months 
would reactivate the program. The program is funded for only two years; 
if  it  is  successful, however, additional  appropriations can  be  made  in 
future years. 
The two manpower training programs, one in OEO and one under the 
Labor Department, could respond automatically to business cycle devel- 
opments if their funding were on a per capita basis, available to everyone 
who signed up. But, under the present law, annual appropriations for the 
total program are made. The only possibility of built-in flexibility arises 
if the programs have not used all of their annual appropriation, as appar- 
ently has been true recently,'8 and if the shortfall reflects a  scarcity of 
eligible applicants, which seems unlikely. 
The list of new grant programs provides no good candidate for rapid 
expansion or contraction even as a discretionary action. Outdoor recrea- 
tion is a possible candidate. Recreation areas fit into the category of small 
public works; they usually can be completed in a summer and tend to be 
17. Emergency  Employment  Act of 1971 (Public Law 92-54), 85 Stat. 146. 
18. Robert Hall,  "Prospects for Shifting the Phillips Curve through Manpower 
Policy," this volume, pp. 691-92. 640  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
self-contained projects. OEO's community action programs could probably 
be expanded fairly rapidly but it is doubtful that they could be contracted 
as readily. Once a community action program has been started, its funding 
is very difficult to reduce. Much the same applies to education programs: 
An expanded level of funding that has become embedded in the planning 
and  budgeting of  local  school  boards is  difficult, if  not  impossible, to 
curtail. Congress is  more likely to  maintain the  real level  of  program 
activity by expanding the funding in line with increases in the cost of living 
or other appropriate price indicators. In a few cases-grants  for construc- 
tion of national guard centers, some flood control projects, and highway 
beautification grants-the  real level of the program has been reduced by 
the failure to expand the dollar funding. 
Many of the other new programs are construction subsidies-for  urban 
renewal, model cities, water and sewer facilities, mass transit, airports, en- 
vironmental protection, and hospitals-that  are not  suitable for discre- 
tionary stabilization policy because the lead times are so long that the eco- 
nomic impact is likely to be felt too late at best and, possibly, at precisely 
the wrong time. 
Proposals To Increase the Built-in Flexibility of Expenditures 
Various proposals have been advanced that would increase the built-in 
flexibility on the expenditure side of the federal budget. The automatic ex- 
tension  of  unemployment benefits from twenty-six to  thirty-nine weeks 
under conditions described above is already in force in thirty-two states. 
Three things could be done to augment the built-in flexibility of this pro- 
gram. First, those receiving extended benefits could be included in calcu- 
lating the  national trigger. Second, the trigger point  could be lowered. 
Although the expansion of coverage should reduce the gap between the 
covered and global rates, a reduction in the trigger to 3.5 or 4.0 percent 
would activate the program sooner. Given the average gap between the 
covered and the global unemployment rates of 1.6 percentage points in the 
1970-71  recession,  the  4.5  percent trigger for  covered  unemployment 
requires a global rate of 6.1 percent. Third, the unemployment insurance 
program could be made more responsive by policies that would encourage 
states to expand its coverage. Although the range in coverage may not be Nancy H. Teeters  641 
as wide as Table 4 suggests, some states undoubtedly could expand coverage 
substantially. 
The built-in flexibility of the federal grants could be increased by devel- 
oping  more  programs like  those  embodied  in  the  public  service  em- 
ployment act. These would be programs that automatically turn on and off 
with variations in the unemployment rate. The recent experience has em- 
phasized the financial problems that state and local governments face in a 
recession. Their revenues either do not increase or actually decline, while 
their expenditures continue to rise; indeed, some-welfare  payments for 
a prime example-are  aggravated by the recession. Since state and local 
governments are  constrained,  often  legally,  to  operate  with  balanced 
budgets, countercyclical revenue grants are needed to  bolster their ex- 
penditures and to prevent perverse increases in their taxes. 
Several  proposals along these lines have been put forth. Joseph Pechman 
has suggested a cyclical grant program that would replace state and local 
revenues lost because of a recession. It would be activated whenever the 
national  unemployment  rate  exceeds  4  percent  for  three  consecutive 
months. Charles L. Schultze has proposed a similar revenue-sharing  pro- 
gram that would take into  account the level of  unemployment in each 
state. Alternatively, such a program could be triggered on a state-by-state 
basis as well as by the national unemployment rate.19  Operating the trigger 
presents no  problem because that  mechanism is  already in  place  and 
functioning in conjunction with the programs for extended unemployment 
benefits and public service employment. 
The loss of state and local revenues because of recessionary economic 
conditions is concentrated in income and sales taxes, revenues that are 
income elastic. Some criterion other than the  amount of  excess unem- 
ployment is necessary to channel the grants to states hard hit because of 
their (and their local jurisdictions') heavy reliance on income-elastic taxes. 
19. Joseph  A. Pechman,  "Fiscal  Federalism  for the 1970s,"  in National Tax Associa- 
tion, Proceedings  of National Tax Association  Seminar  on Balancing  our Federal-State- 
Local Fiscal System (National Tax Journal, Vol. 24, September 1971, pp. 281-90), 
Brookings Reprint 215; Charles  L. Schultze, "Statement"  (testimony  before the Joint 
Economic  Committee  on President  Nixon's Economic  Proposals,  August 20, 1971;  pro- 
cessed), p. 8. See also Frank  W. Schiff,  "Control  of Inflation  and Recession,"  Annals  of 
the American  Academy  of Political and Social Science, Vol. 396 (July 1971), p. 98; and 
The  1971 Midyear  Review  of the Economy,  Report of the Joint Economic Committee, 
92 Cong. 1 sess. (1971), pp. 2, 8, 9. 642  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1971 
In addition some account should be taken of the variation in the amount 
of revenue lost because of the difference in elasticities of sales and income 
taxes. Sales taxes are less elastic than income taxes; therefore, less revenue 
would be lost by states that rely heavily on sales taxes than by those that 
rely primarily on income taxes. The formula developed to take all of these 
factors into account is as follows:20 
(4)  SiR =  x[(SiST)  (SiUi -  SiUitx)]  + y[(SiT) (SiUi -SjUtx)], 
where 
SiR =  each state's countercyclical revenue grant 
SiST =  each state's total (including local) sales and gross receipt taxes 
in the preceding year 
Si  U  =  each  state's  covered  unemployment  rate  in  the  preceding 
quarter 
SiUi,x  =  each state's average covered unemployment rate in the pre- 
ceding year when the national global unemployment rate was 
below 4.5 percent 
SJT  =  each  state's  total  (including  local)  personal  and  corporate 
income taxes 
x  =  the estimated elasticity of sales taxes with respect to unemploy- 
ment 
y  =  the estimated elasticity of income taxes with respect to unem- 
ployment, 
and the bracketed expressions are equal to or greater than zero. 
The  formula assumes the  use  of  seasonally  adjusted unemployment 
rates, so that a normal seasonal rise in unemployment would not entitle a 
state to  countercyclical revenue grants. A  variable for  population  size 
could  have  been  included,  but  it  seemed unnecessary since  the  dollar 
amount of taxes already reflects much of the variation in population size 
among the states. 
With Robert Reischauer's model of state and local receipts and expendi- 
tures and the  covered unemployment rates by  states that  prevailed in 
March 1971, it was possible to determine how much each state would have 
received had countercyclical grants-in-aid  been available. The results, given 
a trigger of 4.5 percent, are shown in Table 12. The total  amount that 
20. This formula  was developed  jointly by Robert D. Reischauer,  Henry  Aaron, and 
myself after experiments  with alternatives.  Peter Henle was helpful in evaluating  for us 
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would have been distributed to the states and localities would have been 
$4.6 billion if the state covered unemployment rates of the first quarter of 
1971 had prevailed all year. During the first quarter of 1971, the revenue 
loss to state and local governments was approximately $7 billion at annual 
rates. Such a formula would distribute slightly more than $1.5 billion (at 
annual rates) in 1971 for each 0.5 percentage point of national unemploy- 
ment above 4.5 percent. 
Under this formula, thirteen states would have received more than $100 
million and two states, New York and California, would have received con- 
siderably more than $500 million. The $738 million going to New York 
would have redressed the nearly $1 billion revenue shortfall estimated by 
the state as a result of the recession. Considerable amounts would have 
gone also to Michigan ($327 million), Pennsylvania ($270 million), Illinois 
($239 million), Massachusetts ($209 million), Washington ($183 million), 
Wisconsin ($167 million), Ohio ($141 million), Minnesota ($132 million), 
Connecticut ($118  million),  New  Jersey ($114  million),  and  Maryland 
($108 million). The rest of the states would have received varying amounts 
of less than $100 million; five of them (including the District of Columbia) 
would have received less than $10 million. But all the states would have 
received some money, the smallest amount going to Wyoming ($2 million). 
If the  national trigger deactivated the program, states that were still 
triggered on could continue to receive grants-in-aid,  in a manner analogous 
to the operation of extended unemployment benefits. Table 5 shows the 
number of states that would have participated in the revenue grants based 
on the weekly reports of the states with their triggers on this year. The 
number declined as the year progressed. 
Experiments were conducted with a variety of alternate formulations. 
The formula presented above has the major advantage of making the grant 
program truly countercyclical and not a permanent subsidy to states with 
chronically high unemployment, such as Alaska. The variable that reflects 
the  average state covered unemployment rate during preceding periods 
when the national global rate was less than 4.5 percent (SiUiC.)  ties the 
revenue-sharing  trigger to the experience of each state during periods of 
national full employment. It also solves the problem of the variation among 
states in the amount of total unemployment  that is covered by the insurance 
program. In one of the formulas, the covered rate for each state was ad- 
justed by the ratio of the past year's covered employment to total unem- 
ployment on a state-by-state basis, and a national trigger used in place of Nancy H. Teeters  645 
Si(itX  Each state calculates its own annual total unemployment rate from 
the covered unemployment rate and there is some doubt that the calcula- 
tion is carried out in a comparable manner in every state. The formula here 
uses the more reliable covered unemployment rate and has the great advan- 
tage of automatically closing out the program. Finally, the localities that do 
use sales and income taxes would automatically receive revenue grants.21 
Conclusions 
The amount of built-in flexibility in federal expenditures is greater than 
has been generally  recognized. That unemployment insurance, AFDC,  and 
state general  welfare are responsive to changing economic conditions comes 
as no surprise. But there are new elements in the sensitivity of expenditures 
to economic conditions. One is the medicaid program, with its close connec- 
tion to the welfare rolls. Another is the rate of growth in the number of 
people receiving benefits under the retirement  programs. For older people 
retirement frequently is  more  socially  acceptable than  unemployment. 
Moreover, since the test of how much one can earn without losing social 
security benefits is applied monthly, a beneficiary  finds it easy to go on and 
off the rolls depending on the employment opportunities available. 
Table 13 summarizes  the estimated impact on federal and state and local 
expenditures of an increase in the global unemployment rate from 4.2 per- 
cent in 1970-71 to the average of 6.0 percent that has prevailed in 1971. The 
state and local governments, with the revenue shortfall of $7 billion and the 
increased expenditures of more than $11/2  billion, would need cyclical reve- 
nue sharing totaling nearly $9 billion, or twice the amount that would have 
been distributed under the formula presented in this paper, to compensate 
them for the effects on their budgets of the recession. 
Because of the recession, federal expenditures  in 1971 were an estimated 
$6.4 billion higher than they would have been without the increased unem- 
ployment. Fifty-six percent of the increase stems from the unemployment 
benefit programs in 1971. Including induced state and local expenditures, 
outlays rose an estimated $7.8 billion. If the 6 percent rate of unemploy- 
ment persists, recession-induced federal expenditures could rise to $10 bil- 
21. In further work, an adjustment  should probably be made to the formula to 
eliminate a peculiarity  it now embodies: More money is distributed  if the global rate 
rises from 3.5 percent  to 6 percent  than if it rises from 4.4 percent  to 6 percent. tl  t  eq ON  o  m  t--11  C1 
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lion in 1972 and to  $13 billion in 1973. Of the increased expenditures in 
1973, only 36 percent would arise out of the unemployment benefit pro- 
grams, reflecting the long lags between increases in unemployment and in- 
creases in welfare and retirement rolls. This estimate reinforces the obser- 
vation that people take unemployment benefits before applying for other 
income maintenance programs. Even if the unemployment rate declines, 
most of the induced increase in the retirement  rolls would remain in force in 
1973. By that year, state and local  expenditures would  be  $2.6 billion 
higher as the result of the hypothesized prolonged slack. 
In the 1972 budget the full employment concept of revenues was used 
officially for the first time. In January the unified budget was presented as 
one balanced at full employment. However, no adjustment was made in 
expenditures for the recession-induced increases, not  even for increased 
unemployment benefits. 
Expenditures have increased somewhat since January, and full employ- 
ment revenues will decline because of the new tax reductions. The unified 
budget is estimated roughly to have an actual deficit of $28 billion; based 
on full employment revenues, the deficit is $8 billion.  If the appropriate 
adjustments  were also made on the expenditure  side, the federal budget cal- 
culated at full employment would be essentially in balance, as would the 
total receipts and expenditures  for state and local governments  (Table 14). 
Table 1 reported federal expenditures  that had been adapted to a full em- 
ployment basis by removing only expenditures for unemployment benefits 
Table 14. Estimated  Federal and State and Local Government  Budgets, 
Fiscal Year 1972 
Billions of dollars 
State and 
Description  Federal  local 
Actual revenues  204  179 
Revenue  shortfall  20  7 
Full employment  revenues  224  186 
Expenditures  232  188 
Official  full employment  deficit  -8  -2 
Induced  expenditures  8?/2  1  '2 
Corrected  full employment  surplus  or deficit  +  1/2  -  '/2 
Source: Author's estimates. 648  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
that were the result of an unemployment rate in excess of 4 percent. If the 
other slack-induced increases are also removed, full employment expen- 
ditures would total only 19.8 percent of potential GNP, not 20.5 percent, as 
shown in the table.22 
22. Table 1 presents  federal  receipts  and expenditures  on the basis of calendar  rather 
than fiscal years. Calendar  year 1972 is likely to have a small full employment  deficit 
because several large expansions in expenditures  are scheduled  to take effect July 1, 
1972,  thus falling into fiscal 1973. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Joseph Pechman: When I first saw Nancy Teeters' paper, I wondered why 
this article had not been written by Cary Brown or David Lusher-or  by 
me-fifteen  years ago when research on tax flexibility became popular. I 
rationalize my lack of initiative on the grounds that built-in expenditure 
flexibility has become a relatively more important characteristic  of the fiscal 
system in the recent past. 
As Table 1 shows, transfer payments, which are the main part of the ex- 
penditure program that has built-in flexibility, amounted to 4.5 percent of 
GNP in 1961 and when we were talking about built-in flexibility in the mid- 
1  950s, they were even smaller. So with the level of transfer  programs  then in 
existence, little automatic stabilization could be expected from the expendi- 
ture side of the budget. We all assumed what Nancy Teeters found-that 
there is virtually no built-in flexibility in purchases. In fact, many of us de- 
tected a reverse  flexibility there. Some of the postwar recessions and booms 
were triggered by discretionary actions regarding purchases, mainly mili- 
tary expenditures. 
The built-in flexibility that the paper detects is really on the "negative 
tax" side rather than on the expenditure side. We have always known that, 
in theory, flexibility could operate both on the negative and the positive 
sides of taxes, and transfers are the negative side of taxes. The amount of 
built-in flexibility that one observes is now significant, and it may become 
even more significant as society moves further to improve the lot  of the 
poor. 
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Nevertheless, the amount of built-in flexibility on the negative tax side is 
still relatively modest when compared with that in the positive tax system. 
That is the case for obvious reasons: The positive tax system is much larger 
than the negative tax system. I have made some very rough calculations 
that give a flavor of the differences. Assuming that unemployment remains 
at 6 percent in 1972 and 1973, the GNP gap, according to my calculations, 
rises from $70 billion in 1971 to  $75 billion in 1972 and to $80 billion in 
1973. On the assumption, which Nancy Teeters confirmed for me with her 
full employment table for 1971, that the decrease in federal revenue associ- 
ated with the GNP gap is roughly 30 percent (at least, somewhere between 
25 and 35 percent), the loss in revenue due to the gap is thus about $21 
billion in 1971-approximately  three-tenths of the $70 billion GNP gap- 
and $24 billion in  1973. These numbers compare with the  $61/2 billion, 
nearly.  $10 billion, and more than $13 billion that have been estimated for 
the expenditure  effects for these three years. In 1971, the contribution from 
expenditures is only about three-tenths of that from taxes; it works its way 
up but is still only about one-half in 1973. In other words, the tax kicker 
not only is much larger but also starts more rapidly, according to  these 
results. 
I agree with Nancy Teeters on the importance of exploring ways to in- 
crease the amount of  built-in flexibility in expenditures. Improving and 
increasing transfer  payments will do this and will also help the poor. Need- 
less to say, as an advocate of revenue sharing of all sorts, I heartily endorse 
the suggestion that the federal government add cyclical revenue sharing 
to its gamut of grants. It is justifiable on substantive grounds to ensure that 
state and local governments need not stop their spending merely because 
the federal government does not  do  its job  of  stabilizing the economy. 
Moreover, the program would contribute extra built-in flexibility. 
I also agree that it would be highly desirable to improve the trigger on 
extended unemployment compensation, which is, I think, wholly inade- 
quate. The trigger now goes on if the national covered unemployment rate 
is 41/2  percent, which is a total unemployment rate of about 6 percent. The 
states trigger at 4 percent covered unemployment, if their rate is 20 percent 
above the comparable three-month period in the two preceding  years. 
Unemployment compensation and public service employment are two 
expenditure  programs that contain formula flexibility. This is an important 
-even  a rather amazing-innovation  in the fiscal system. We have not 
been able to get any formula flexibility on the tax side and I doubt whether 
even now the time is ripe for introducing it. But we should keep trying. Nancy H. Teeters  651 
Warren Smith: This  paper discusses possible  changes in  the  degree of 
built-in stability that may have resulted from the substantial changes that 
have occurred in recent years in the composition of the expenditure side of 
the federal budget. The subject is obviously important. Given the notable 
lack  of  success in implementing a flexible discretionary fiscal policy  in 
recent years, the more built-in stability injected into the fiscal system the 
better. Having said that, however, one should point out that built-in sta- 
bility cuts two ways. As long as the economy stays near the full employment 
path, built-in stability helps to keep it on track. But if it is permitted to 
drift substantially away from the path, the existence of built-in stability 
increases the magnitude of the discretionary  action-whether  it be through 
fiscal or monetary policy-needed  to get back on target. 
It seems reasonable that the shift in the composition of federal expendi- 
tures away from purchases of goods and services and toward transfer pay- 
ments and grants-in-aid has acted to increase built-in stability. Purchases 
make little contribution-indeed,  in some cases they may in a sense be 
destabilizing-because  as  a  practical matter expenditures may  have  to 
increase to  keep pace with rising prices during inflation. Many types of 
transfer payments and some types of grants tend to be stabilizing in their 
effects either because of their inherent behavior or because the programs 
have been designed for that purpose. 
The Teeters paper tries to measure the contributions, especially of the 
various transfer  programs, to built-in stability primarily by trying to relate 
changes in the numbers of transfer recipients to cyclical variables. While 
the results are interesting and to some extent useful, the formulations used 
in some of the equations as well as some of the results seem rather strange 
and not very plausible to me. 
It seems to me that it would be desirable to develop some kinds of rela- 
tively simple models to explain the behavior of some of the categories of 
transfer expenditures and then consider carefully how  cyclical variables 
might be introduced. In the case of OASI recipients, for example, demo- 
graphic considerations-the  numbers of persons in the eligible age cate- 
gories-would  seem to be the most important factor and should therefore 
be incorporated into the equation. Cyclical variables might then be intro- 
duced to explain changes in retirement  behavior among the eligible group. 
As it stands, much of the statistical work seems to have a decidedly ad hoc 
quality, which raises doubts in my mind about the results. 
In some of the equations, the logic underlying the selection of particular 
explanatory variables is not very clear. For example, I have some difficulty 652  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
in understanding  the logic of the equations concerning veterans, which re- 
late the changes in the natural logs of the number of recipients of veterans' 
benefits to the changes in the natural logs of the numbers of veterans and 
their average ages. 
In view of the rapid escalation of the AFDC program since 1965, which 
is handled by introducing a time trend (described as a dummy variable) 
starting at that point, the cyclical behavior of the program may well have 
changed in recent years. It would seem desirable, therefore, to examine the 
recent behavior of that program separately and quite carefully. 
The objective of the paper, of course, is not to explain as fully as possible 
the determinants of the various categories of expenditures but rather to 
determine merely the extent of their cyclical sensitivity. The trouble with 
this approach is that unless an effort is made to develop a full explanation 
of the behavior of the expenditures, one cannot feel very confident that the 
cyclical responses have been accurately captured. For this reason, I do not 
believe that the summary  results for built-in stability resulting from transfer 
programs presented in Table 13 can be regarded as anything more than 
very rough approximations. While the subject is important, I believe more 
work is needed before dependable estimates can be made. 
The most interesting recent development has been the introduction of 
programs, such as the extended unemployment benefit program and the 
grants under the public service employment act, that are "triggered" by 
rises  in  the  unemployment rate.  The  Pechman-Schultze proposals  for 
grants to replace state and local revenues lost due to  recession are of a 
similar type. These programs are really examples of what economists used 
to call "formula flexibility,"  under which elements of the federal budget are 
tied to certain indexes of the performance of the economy. I am pleased to 
observe some acceptance of the principle of formula flexibility, and I see 
the possibility of some further  extension of this principle. In the discussions 
of possible ways of increasing the cyclical flexibility of the personal income 
tax some years ago, it seemed to me that there were two ways in which this 
might be accomplished. One would be to give the President some limited 
discretion to change tax rates, and the other would be to tie tax rates to 
some indicator of the performance of the economy, such as the unemploy- 
ment rate. I would prefer the discretionary approach, but the possibility 
of  achieving it  seems increasingly remote. In view  of  the fact that the 
formula-flexibility  approach has already achieved some acceptance, it may 
be useful to revive the idea in the personal income tax. Nancy H. Teeters  653 
It is perhaps worth noting that the formula-flexibility schemes that have 
been introduced into the system thus far (extended unemployment benefits 
and the public service employment program) are asymmetrical  in their op- 
eration; that is, they operate to counteract the effects of a recession and an 
increase in unemployment, but they die out when full employment is re- 
stored and do not operate to check an inflationary boom. The Pechman- 
Schultze proposals for countercyclical grants to  state and local  govern- 
ments would have the same characteristics.  This complicates policy making, 
because it introduces an additional element of asymmetry  into the response 
of the economy to discretionary  policy measures. This characteristic is not, 
however, inherent in formula-flexibility schemes; it would be possible, in 
principle at least, to make a formula-flexibility  scheme-involving,  for ex- 
ample, the personal income tax-symmetrical  in its operation. 
To summarize my reaction to the paper, I believe it serves a useful pur- 
pose in pulling together a description of recent developments on the ex- 
penditure side of the federal budget from the standpoint of their possible 
contribution to automatic stabilization. But I think more work is needed 
on a number of analytical and statistical issues to make the quantitative 
estimates of built-in flexibility more dependable. 
General Discussion 
Many members of the panel commented on the sharp uptrend in the 
number of AFDC beneficiaries  since 1965. Joseph Pechman shared Warren 
Smith's uneasiness about the time trend variable used in the equation. 
Lawrence Klein pointed out that the variable implied a quadratic time 
trend in the level of beneficiaries. He felt this was an acceptable econo- 
metric procedure, but that it was dangerous to extrapolate the results over 
any substantial period of time. 
Nancy Teeters said she had no intention of extrapolating the trend into 
the future. She had been obliged to use the variable in the equation because 
the data made it obvious that something happened after 1965. The 1969-70 
recession provided the first and only test of the cyclical responsiveness of 
AFDC  under post-1965 circumstances. The number of recipients leveled 
off in the first six months of 1971, but it is not clear whether in response to 
recovery or to a tightening up of state rules. The development needs more 654  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
time to reveal whether a new long-range trend has begun due to changing 
attitudes toward welfare. 
R. J. Gordon reported that, in an exploratory study of the increase of the 
AFDC  rolls in New York, David Gordon got results suggesting that the 
number of people receiving benefits is related to the level of the benefits as 
a fraction of mean income. The faster benefits go up, the more incentive 
low-income individuals are given to  quit working and to  accept welfare 
benefits. 
Robert Hall said that Daniel Patrick Moynihan hypothesized a few years 
ago  that the  connection  between AFDC  and unemployment had  been 
broken sometime during the sixties. That implied that increases in unem- 
ployment would no longer enlarge AFDC caseloads. The evidence then, of 
course, was that AFDC started to shoot up after 1965 when the unemploy- 
ment rate was going down. But these equations show the opposite-a  con- 
siderable sensitivity of AFDC  to unemployment. Surely that finding de- 
pends on the unexplained dummy time trend variable. The behavior of 
AFDC in 1970 does seem to suggest that Moynihan was wrong, and in fact 
large increases in the number of cases for other reasons drowned out the 
sensitivity of the program to the unemployment rate when unemployment 
was going down in the mid-sixties. 
Demographic considerations may help to explain the uptrend, Hall sug- 
gested. AFDC  recipients are primarily women  aged  18 to  30,  and the 
18-year-olds of 1965 were born in 1947, the first year of the baby boom. 
The particular  age group of 18-30-year-olds grew rapidly in the late sixties. 
When these women began bearing children, AFDC  cases shot up. The 
propensity to be a recipient of AFDC  is very sensitive to the presence of 
very young children in the family. A common pattern among single moth- 
ers is to go back into the labor force once the children reach school age, 
which suggests a good reason to be optimistic about the future behavior 
of the AFDC  rolls. R. A. Gordon added that demographic trends in the 
size of the large metropolitan areas and in shifts within them-between  the 
central cities and the suburbs-may  help to explain the acceleration in wel- 
fare payments. These demographic elements certainly changed between the 
first part of the sixties and the end of the decade. 
Albert Rees agreed with Nancy Teeters' judgment that the war on pov- 
erty and the activity of the welfare rights organization explained a good 
part of the trend since 1965. But he felt that legislative changes and changes 
in the judicial interpretation of the law also contributed. The introduction Nancy H. Teeters  655 
of the AFDC-UP  program, the program for families that include a father 
in the household, accounts in part for the rise in the number of cases. Rees 
pointed out that state welfare agencies administer this program with a set 
of eligibility criteria. Presumably everyone who meets these criteria gets 
benefits. But, in practice, the budget is quite frequently not large enough to 
cover all the people who are eligible, and the administrators choose re- 
cipients from among them by interpreting  these criteria  more or less tightly. 
Some of the devices traditionally used for that purpose, like residency re- 
quirements, were struck down by the courts during this period, increasing 
the post-1965 caseloads. Because of the recession, the state and local budget 
constraints have tightened up recently, and devices to hold down the wel- 
fare rolls that are still legal or at least not clearly illegal are probably being 
invoked by state administrators to an increasing extent. That is probably 
holding down the rolls currently, Rees suspected. 
Thomas Juster noted that two essentially different kinds of considera- 
tions had been stressed: One kind can be extrapolated and measured; the 
other is subject only to  "feel," or statistically to treatment as a dummy. 
The issue of demographic composition that Hall mentioned is of the former 
type: We know how many people are eligible for support, given the law. 
But the issue Rees raised-the  difference between who is eligible and who 
gets benefits-is  of the latter type. That difference  is a consequence of social 
institutions and attitudes-how  people feel about welfare, how much in- 
formation they have, and whether they consider it socially acceptable. All 
of this defies quantification. 
Paul Samuelson commented that, if Rees was correct that states adjust 
eligibility in practice in light of their budget constraints, the amount of 
built-in countercyclical flexibility in the welfare system would be reduced. 
Nancy Teeters reported on some studies of welfare that she and William 
Branson made a few years ago. They calculated hypothetical eligibility by 
taking the number of poor people and guessing how many had young chil- 
dren. They were struck that the number of eligible people had always been 
huge. The number eligible was larger relative to the rolls in the decade of 
the fifties and the early part of the sixties than it has been since 1965. In 
making projections, they found that if the rolls continued to increase at 
the rate of the 1965-70 period, and if the number of poor people continued 
to decline at the same rate as in 1965-70, there would be 13 million people 
on the rolls by 1975 and everybody eligible would be receiving AFDC  by 
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The panel was interested in  the  proposal  for revenue-sharing grants 
keyed to a cyclical formula. R. J. Gordon commented that one of the most 
important impacts of the recession had been the fiscal squeeze on state and 
local governments. In addition to countering that squeeze, the proposal for 
cyclical revenue sharing, he  believed, would have the further beneficial 
effect of increasing the incentive for states to shift from sales taxes to in- 
come  taxes  and thus  of  making the  whole  tax  system gradually more 
progressive. 
Arthur Okun said that the proposal for cyclical revenue sharing assumed 
that state and local governments would in fact spend the grants or avoid 
tax increases, rather than shift into surplus. That assumption is consistent 
with the fact that budgets of the state and local government sector in the 
national accounts stay close to balance, which must mean that these gov- 
ernments do offset their cyclical revenue loss in one way or another, either 
by raising taxes or by holding down the growth of expenditures. In light 
of that, presumably they could be relied upon to respond to cyclical reve- 
nue grants in ways that contribute to aggregate demand. But it would be 
desirable to have more solid evidence to support that assumption. 
Okun also stressed the significance of the estimated built-in stabilization 
on the expenditure side. While it was small relative to that on the revenue 
side, as Pechman had noted, it is really large enough to affect the picture 
of how fiscal policy moved in 1969, 1970, and 1971. The official estimate 
of the full employment unified budget made no allowance for any induced 
expenditures due to the slump, not even unemployment compensation. An 
allowance of $61/2  billion for automatically induced outlays reveals that the 
fiscal posture is much less expansionary than it looks superficially. On the 
other hand, in 1968 and early 1969, expenditures were less than their full 
employment level,  and the  full employment budget would,  when thor- 
oughly adjusted, show up as more expansionary. 
George Perry felt that the effect on aggregate demand per dollar of in- 
duced expenditures was likely to exceed that of induced revenues. About 
half of the total cyclical swing in revenues stems from corporate profits 
taxes, where the short-run effect per dollar on demand is probably quite 
small. 
William Branson underlined a point Warren Smith had mentioned-that 
one man's built-in flexibility is another man's fiscal drag. The paper as- 
sumes that an increased amount of built-in flexibility is desirable, and this 
is valid if the authorities manage discretionary fiscal and monetary policy Nancy  H. Teeters  657 
properly. But if, for example, they tended to tighten up prematurely in a 
recovery, increased built-in flexibility could worsen overall performance. 
R. J. Gordon expressed his interest in a topic explicitly omitted from the 
paper-how  government expenditures respond to changes in the rate of in- 
flation. Klein noted some asymmetries.  While gains in real income actually 
tend to reduce transfer payments, inflationary increases in income do not. 
On the revenue side, inflation is a tax collector because it pushes people 
into higher income tax brackets, and that tends to stabilize, but no counter- 
part to the process exists on the expenditure side. 
Nancy Teeters expressed some confidence that government expenditures 
move up in line with inflation but with a lag. The budget estimates for each 
fiscal year assume the price level of the preceding calendar year, because 
agencies are specifically  instructed  by the Office of Management and Budget 
to make their estimates that way. She and Charles Schultze, in Setting Na- 
tional  Priorities, made five-year projections of the budget. There were price 
variables on both the revenue and expenditure  sides that they could and did 
alter. The lagged response of the expenditure side to inflation, in combina- 
tion with the immediate impact on the revenue side, can have a marked 
effect on the surplus or deficit when the inflation rate changes sharply. She 
noted that the price impact on expenditures will be increased and sped up 
if a cost-of-living escalator is introduced into social security benefits, as 
provided by H.R. 1. Of course, benefits have been adjusted by legislative 
action every two years, at least in part to  compensate for inflation, and 
hence it is not clear just how much difference a provision for automatic 
increases would make. 
R. J. Gordon wondered whether the increased built-in fiscal flexibility 
on the expenditure side may have been offset by reduced revenue elasticity 
as a result of the net shift from personal and corporate income taxes to 
social security taxes. Nancy Teeters agreed that the increasing importance 
of payroll taxes has reduced built-in flexibility on the revenue side. She 
stated her conviction that reform of the payroll tax deserves high priority 
for this and other reasons, and her intention to deal with this issue and 
other revenue matters in future research. 